



WHY IS THERE NO 
PHILOSOPHY OF POLITICAL 
SCIENCE?
Bruno Verbeek and Lee McIntyre
When looking at the field of philosophy of social science, it is striking that there are so many 
common questions across the disciplines that are concerned with explaining human behavior. 
Questions about the nature of explanation, the proper unit of analysis, reductionism, social ontol-
ogy, methodological individualism— as well as other various questions about methodology— all 
seem to bubble up.
When we turn to the individual social sciences, however, something remarkable appears— 
or rather does not appear. While most disciplines have room for systematic reflection on the 
philosophical dimensions of their own particular field, not all of them exist. There is a well- 
established body of literature referred to as “philosophy of economics” which deals with funda-
mental concepts, methods, and problems that economic thought unearths. Similarly, there is a 
small but thriving field of philosophy of history (not to be confused with the large and thriving 
field of history of philosophy). There is philosophy of psychology, and even a budding philoso-
phy of (Western and non- Western) sociology and anthropology. To a large extent these fields 
have their own journals, conferences, professional associations, and students. This is not the 
case, however, for one of the commonly recognized “big six” of the social sciences— economics, 
psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, and political science. And so we ask why, so far, has 
there been no field recognized as the “philosophy of political science?”
Now to say this does not mean that there has been no work in this area. Although this may 
sound like a contradiction, it is important to point out that a remarkably similar situation once 
existed in the philosophy of chemistry. Although there were a few scholars doing excellent 
work on relevant questions, there was no formally recognized discipline called the “philosophy 
of chemistry” until about 1997. Then everything changed. The field saw a sudden explosion of 
interest, resulting in two journals, an annual international conference, various research sym-
posia, and several anthologies. And along with self- conscious recognition came a wealth of 
opportunities.1
Does a similar situation now exist for the philosophy of political science? In asking this, it 
is important to do an assessment of the current standing of the field. For one thing, there is 
a Master’s Degree program in the philosophy of political science offered at the University of 
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Leiden. How can it possibly be that there is a graduate program in a subject when there is no 
subject? The answer is that of course there is a subject, but perhaps it has just not gotten enough 
philosophical attention or recognition. Either the philosophy of political science already exists 
(but it just not called that), or it doesn’t exist (because it shouldn’t), or it should exist (but 
doesn’t). Whichever of these possibilities explains the fact that there has so far been no formally 
recognized discipline that goes by this name— making it the longest- standing “missing tooth” in 
the philosophy of social science— the fact that work in this field has at least been neglected by 
most philosophers of science is beyond dispute.
If one looks at the table of contents for the spate of recent handbooks, guides, and compan-
ions that have cropped up in the philosophy of social science over the last fifteen years (Turner 
and Roth 2003; Jarvie and Zamora- Bonilla 2011; kincaid 2012) there is a discernible pattern. 
Although most feature ample coverage of issues in the philosophy of economics, history, and 
psychology, only one of them (kincaid 2012) features an article with more than passing men-
tion of political science. The situation is apparently no better at the biennial meeting of the 
Philosophy of Science Association (PSA), which showcases work throughout the philosophy of 
science (including both the philosophy of chemistry and the philosophy of social science). In 
a recent blog post Eric Schliesser asks “why the lack of philosophical interest in so many social 
sciences?”2 He goes on to point out that at the 2014 PSA meeting in Chicago, there was ample 
representation of the philosophy of economics, but almost no coverage of any issues that could 
be said to fall within the philosophy of sociology, anthropology, or political science “despite the 
‘naturalistic’ turn of the last four decades.” The same is true if one looks for research symposia, 
books, papers, and most anything else with “philosophy of political science” in its title.
So has the philosophy of political science— insofar as it exists— at least been neglected?
Perhaps the answer to this oversight has more to do with institutional forces than with schol-
arship. Political science arrived relatively late as an academic discipline. Before the mid- 1800s 
there was a lot of scholarly work on politics done by historians and philosophers. In addition, 
there was more applied work done by the German Polizeiwissenschaft and the French Écoles 
d’Administration. Political science made its official debut in the American academic arena 
around 1860 and for a long time it was really an American discipline. From its very inception as 
political science practitioners placed far less emphasis on normative political theory than their 
intellectual predecessors. Instead, they sought to come up with a positive science of politics. 
Initially, they used historical methods.3 Later generations of political scientists abandoned for a 
large part the historical approach and tried to model the discipline after the natural sciences.4
This had a strong boost with the arrival of behaviorism and later with the adoption of new 
institutionalism after World War II. The political scientists of those days were anxious to distin-
guish themselves from political theorists. Political scientists sought to create a positive science 
and shed the fascination with normative speculation and ideal theory, which one of them— 
William Riker— characterized as “belles lettres, criticism, and philosophical speculation” as 
well as “phenomenology and hermeneutics” to distance his preferred branch of science from 
those approaches. Thus the self- image of those political scientists was that of a new science, 
unburdened with the “journalism” of earlier scholars, engaged in some hard- nosed inquiries 
about political behavior modeled after some ideal vista of (natural) science. (In this way, the 
methodological history of political science seems to have taken a page from economics, which 
underwent a similar change during with the “marginal revolution” of Jevons and Walras.) The 
discipline was simply too busy distancing itself from more philosophical approaches to engage in 
much philosophical reflection on its core concepts, methods, and theories. As an explanation 
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for the absence of such reflection this is not very convincing, however, since similar processes 
occurred in the establishment of the other branches of social science (notably psychology and 
economics) and this did not stop them from developing a systematic philosophical reflection on 
their disciplines. So the question remains: why is there no philosophy of political science?
Another possible explanation is that the label ‘political science’ as it is understood these 
days covers a plethora of approaches, theories, methods, objects of study, and intellectual tradi-
tions. It is natural to conclude that there is no single discipline of political science. If one looks 
at the various sub- disciplines that are traditionally included in political science this impres-
sion gets stronger. What do political theory, comparative politics, public administration, inter-
national relations, public law, and political economy have in common? This impression of a 
hodge- podge of disciplinary methodology is enhanced if one reflects on the approaches politi-
cal scientists use: positivism, interpretivism, rational choice theory, behaviorism, structuralism, 
post- structuralism, realism, institutionalism, and pluralism. Perhaps the best we can say is that 
there is a (set of) topics and concerns that ‘political scientists’ share, typically referred to as 
‘politics’. In this regard, political science is not unlike, say, the study of marketing or area studies. 
That is, there is no political science as a unified discipline, what unites political scientists is a 
common topic of study. No wonder that there is no philosophy of political science.
However, this explanation will not do either. First, because it is unclear what the common 
topic is.5 Political scientists study wildly diverging topics ranging from parliamentary history 
to comparative political psychology, voting and elections, political movements, etc. The only 
thing these topics have in common is that they are in the domain of political science— and not 
even exclusively so, as people working in sociology, history, and anthropology concern them-
selves with these things as well. More importantly, the situation is not that different from the 
other special sciences. There too, an overabundance of ideas, approaches, theories, objects of 
study, and traditions shape the self- image of the field. And, once again, these sciences have their 
own ‘philosophy of’ so why would political science be so different?
Still another explanation for the absence of a philosophy of political science says that there 
are no special philosophical problems raised by the research of political scientists. That is, the 
philosophy of political science is just a run of the mill application of the philosophy of social sci-
ence to the activities and concerns of political scientists. The philosophical problems political 
scientists face are no different from those, say, an economist or a psychologist might face. Could 
this be why there is no philosophy of political science? We note again a relevant similarity here 
to the debate over the founding of the philosophy of chemistry, when some initially said that the 
reason there was no such discipline was that all of the interesting questions in it were already 
taken up in the philosophy of physics. Had this been true, however, one would have expected 
the philosophy of physics to consider more questions that were of actual interest to chemists, 
rather than being almost exclusively concerned with relativity, quantum mechanics, and space- 
time. There did turn out to be some good philosophical questions in the philosophy of chemistry 
that were irreducible to the philosophy of physics, the first of which was whether chemistry itself 
was in fact completely reducible to physics. Similarly, one might now ask the question: if the 
philosophy of political science does not exist because it is reducible to some other discipline, 
what would that discipline be?
Some might argue that the successful introduction of formal economic methodology in politi-
cal science shows that political science, understood as a positive science, basically is economics 
applied to the study of politics.6 Certainly, if one looks at the bulk of publications from the last 
decade of the previous century in the American Political Science Review (by many considered to 
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be the journal in political science) this argument has some merit. Most publications consisted 
either of detailed survey comparisons or of formal models of certain aspects of political processes 
(often without any empirical testing) inspired by the sort of work done by the best economic 
modelers. However, by the beginning of the 21st century, there was a lot of resistance to this 
kind of one- sided methodological approach and when in 2000 the so- called “Perestroika” move-
ment emerged, it became clear that many, if not most, political scientists would not support this 
reduction of political science to economics, either substantially or formally.7
At this point, the question in our title may seem a bit odd, for if none of these aforementioned 
factors could explain, let alone justify, the absence of a philosophy of political science, one might 
feel moved to ask: “should it exist?” or “doesn’t it already?” After all, perhaps the work is just 
being done under the name of political theory by philosophers and political scientists alike. In 
what follows we will suggest that there are in fact some fundamental philosophical questions 
that are specific to the study of human political behavior. What is more, practitioners of politi-
cal science are often aware of these results. In other words, we will suggest that there is (and 
should be) a philosophy of political science. However, unlike the other disciplines in the social 
sciences, there has as yet been no separate field of study commonly referred to as the “philosophy 
of political science.”
A lot of philosophical analysis of political behavior is being done under the heading of politi-
cal theory, yet political theorists do not have a monopoly on all philosophically interesting 
aspects of political science. For one thing, we would take it as a virtue that if a field called “the 
philosophy of political science” comes forward, it would be recognized— like its brethren “the 
philosophy of economics” and “the philosophy of psychology”— as a branch of the philosophy 
of social science, which is itself a branch of the philosophy of science. Here it seems impor-
tant to draw a potential distinction between the “philosophy of political science” and “political 
theory.” Obviously, the latter field has existed for thousands of years, and traces its roots back 
to Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Machiavelli, and Condorcet, roots that are intertwined 
with the roots of philosophy itself. This does not mean, however, that the only philosophical 
interest here concerns theory, for, as we have seen, political science at its incipience put itself 
forward as an empirical discipline. This should put at least some questions in the philosophical 
study of political science squarely in the wheelhouse of the philosophy of social science (and so 
the philosophy of science), where we may be rightly concerned with explanation, laws, reduc-
tionism, and other methodological issues in the scientific study of human behavior. Indeed, if 
the distinction between theory and behavior does not exist in the social sciences, then why 
hasn’t there been more debate over whether economics deserved its own “philosophy of” des-
ignation and could have been better handled as “economic theory?” Why did political science, 
along with economics, psychology, and certain branches of sociology, long ago come forward as 
a quantitative discipline with a laser- like focus on the scientific explanation of human behav-
ior? Because they recognized that in the actual world, we do not always behave as rationally 
or consistently as we do in theory. And, even if the earliest economic models had difficulties 
with its own simplifying assumptions about “perfect information” and “perfect rationality,” the 
philosophy of economics was nonetheless born of an interest in seeing how, in comparison with 
actual behavior, we might make our explanations better. In fact, one wonders whether all of the 
previous philosophical criticism over the inadequate methodology of neoclassical economics is 
what has led, in recent years, to the much more rigorous (experimental) research program of 
behavioral economics. Might a similar methodological revolution be on the horizon if we turned 
the attention of more philosophers of science toward political science?
9781138825758pt4_p383-448.indd   436 9/28/2016   4:04:46 PM
437
WHY IS THERE NO PHILOSOPHY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE?
437
In what follows, we will give three more or less interdependent examples of current work done 
by political scientists that is distinctively philosophical in nature and of particular interest to 
the concerns of empirical political scientists. Of course these three examples do not exhaust the 
philosophical questions within political science, nor are they completely representative of such 
questions, but they do support our assertion that a more self- conscious focus on the issues that 
may arise from the “philosophy of political science” might yield many benefits.8
Voting
Perhaps the most distinctive act of political activity in all contemporary states is the act of vot-
ing. Political scientists have studied voting behavior systematically since the 1940s, focusing on 
the determinants of voting behavior, the interplay between institutional rules, and strategies of 
political candidates. Often they have attempted to predict election results, thus living up to the 
self- image of political science as a positive discipline.
However, the practice of voting raises all kinds of fundamental philosophical questions about 
the activity and its coherence. First, there are fundamental questions as to why people vote in 
the first place. As Downs(1957) and others have remarked, in many circumstances it makes no 
sense to vote.9 An example can bring home the point. Suppose all that matters to a typical voter 
is that her preferred candidate, A, wins the district seat in a winner- take- all, single- vote system. 
Suppose furthermore that there are ninety- nine voters in this district and that there are only 
two candidates, A and B. Then either her vote is the deciding vote that gets candidate A the 
win or it is not. This is the case only if the vote is completely tied. That is, if A has exactly 
fort- nine supporters and B has the remaining forty- nine votes. Even if we assume that for each 
typical voter in this group the probability that they support A equals 0.5, then the probability 
that her vote will be the deciding one is 0.01. For any other distribution that probability rapidly 
approaches 0. Since most actual elections have more than two candidates, and the probability 
with which candidates are supported varies, the chance that one’s vote is decisive is negligible. 
Given that voting requires some effort and that other things besides the outcome of the election 
will matter to voters, it is unlikely that voting is actually worth the effort— it is irrational. Yet, 
paradoxically, people vote.10
This initial conclusion has raised a lot of discussion about the motivation of voters. Downs’s 
theory is an example of the so- called public choice school in political science, which takes 
its inspiration from economic theory.11 Public choice theory models political agents as self- 
interested preference maximizers whose behavior is rational relative to those preferences. In 
doing so, it proposes a very particular and somewhat restricted view of voting behavior. It leaves 
out expressive or intrinsic reasons for voting that motivate voters to express their political pref-
erences. If those are taken into account, voting once again seems to make sense.12 However, it 
does so at a cost, for it abandons the elegant— if somewhat unrealistic— picture of political man 
as a rational preference maximizer and imbues her with drives and motives that seem puzzling 
from the point of view of the public choice approach.13 More generally, discussions such as these 
have flagged a fundamental concern about the plausibility of the implicit picture of the citizen 
in empirically oriented political theory.14
It is not just the motivation of individual voters that seems paradoxical; it has long been 
observed that common democratic voting procedures are problematic as well. Nicolas de 
Condorcet (1743– 94) already proved that simple majority rule could result in incoherent overall 
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social preferences.15 For example, suppose one third of the electorate prefers candidate A to B to 
C; another third B to C to A, and a final third C to A to B. Then the majority of this electorate 
prefers A to B; B to C and C to A. Thus, even if individual political preferences are perfectly 
coherent and rational, the overall ranking of alternatives need not be. Two hundred years later, 
Nobel Prize winner kenneth Arrow generalized this observation and proved that any voting 
procedure that meets some very weak and plausible requirements can generate such results. His 
proof is one of the central results of social choice theory— the formal theory of collective deci-
sion processes and procedures.16
A quick discussion of Arrow’s impossibility result may be helpful to illustrate this. Let 
N = {1, 2, …, n} (with n > 2) be the set of voters and X = {x, y, z, ….} be the set of alternatives 
submitted to the vote (these can be candidates, policies, proposals, etc.). Suppose that each 
individual i has a preference ordering Ri over these alternatives. Let the function F be a voting 
rule that gives an overall ordering of the alternatives R. Then these are the requirements that 
Arrow proposed:
• Universal domain: F takes as its domain the set of all logically possible profiles of complete and 
transitive individual preference orderings. In other words, a plausible voting rule works for all 
possible electoral preference rankings of alternatives.
• Ordering: For any profile of individual rankings < R1, R2, …, Rn > in the domain of F, the over-
all ordering R is complete and transitive. So the overall ordering that F gives, will include all 
the alternatives and is non- cyclical.
• Weak Pareto principle: For any profile < R1, R2, …, Rn > in the domain of F, if all individuals 
rank x over y, then F ranks x over y. This is a weak unanimity requirement.
• Independence of irrelevant alternatives: For any two profiles < R1, R2, …, Rn > and < R*1, R*2, 
…, R* n> in the domain of F and any x, y ∈ X, if for all i ∈ N Ri’s ranking between x and y 
coincides with R*i’s ranking between x and y, then xRy if and only if xR*y. This just means 
that the overall order between x and y will not change if other alternatives are added to X.
• Non- dictatorship: There does not exist an individual i ∈ N such that, for all < R1, R2, …, Rn > 
in the domain of F and all x, y ∈ X, xPiy implies xPy.
Notice that these requirements are indeed plausible and seemingly innocent. We already saw 
that simple majority rule does not satisfy these requirements. Condorcet’s theorem illustrates 
this: in the example above there was no clear ‘winner’. Arrow proved that there is no voting rule 
F that satisfies these conditions.
There is enormous variety in voting procedures: majoritarian rules, rank- dependent systems 
(e.g. Borda rule), winner- take- all, etc. Arrow’s formalization gives the theorist the tools to char-
acterize any possible voting procedure. However, the importance of Arrow’s work is not just 
theoretical. It gave focus to a lot of research in real- world electoral systems and their problems. 
For example, it is well confirmed that voting procedures tend to co- vary with electoral constel-
lations and political outcomes. For example, a much- discussed observation is ‘Duverger’s law’, 
which says that plurality rule voting in a single member district system favors two- party systems 
as is the case in the USA and the Uk.17 Social choice theory gave researchers tools to put 
Duverger’s law to the test and improve upon it.18
Arrow’s impossibility theorem has been regarded as a challenge for political scientists who 
are interested in voting procedures. William Riker argued that the theorem shows that popu-
list democracy is incoherent.19 He also argued that there is at least one historical example of a 
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radical failure of the sort that Arrow’s theorem predicts: the voting in the United States House 
of Representatives that led to the start of the American Civil War resulted in a non- transitive 
outcome. Others have taken issue with his claim that democracy is incoherent.20 Still others 
have taken issue with the requirements of Arrow. For example, Duncan Black has shown that 
if one restricts the universal domain condition in such a way that only well- behaved ‘single- 
peaked’ rankings are in the domain of F, then the overall ordering will be complete and transi-
tive.21 Others have taken issue with the Pareto requirement since it can imply that individual 
rights will be violated, rendering it less attractive as a requirement.22
Similarly, the requirement of the independence of irrelevant alternatives has attracted some 
scrutiny.23 It turns out that rules that violate this requirement are vulnerable to strategic voting. 
Strategic voting is voting behavior where voters do not vote according to their real preference, 
but instead vote in such a manner that the overall result will be more to their preference. A well- 
known example concerns the voting by supporters of Ralph Nader in the 2000 presidential 
election who voted for Al Gore rather than Nader so as to prevent George Bush from winning— 
their least preferred alternative. Alan Gibbard and William Sattertwaite have shown that voting 
rules that result in unique winners that satisfy universal domain and non- dictatorship conditions 
(and have at least three alternatives) can be manipulated in that way.24 This then again raises 
questions about the motivation of voters to vote in a particular way: to what extent can one be 
sure that these reflect actual political preferences? Since many actually used voting procedures 
(such as the Borda rule or the plurality rule) violate this requirement, one also wonders to what 
extent the resulting collective outcome reflects the political preferences of voters.
The important thing to realize is that these results are the outcome of meticulous theoreti-
cal thought about voting as well as empirical research. They provoke intense debate about the 
nature of voting, the role of institutional rules about voting, as well as questions of institutional 
design. Here then is one example of a range of philosophical questions that have been consid-
ered primarily— but of course not exclusively— within circles of political scientists, that are ripe 
for more philosophical work.
Democracy
Voting is the quintessential political act that most adults in modern liberal democracies will 
ever perform. It is no coincidence then that many political scientists interested in voting are 
concerned with democracy as well. Democracy, in its most general and abstract meaning, refers 
to those methods of collective decision making that are characterized by a kind of equality 
among the participants. This requirement of equality can be conceived in purely formal terms 
in that every vote counts equally towards the result, as is the case in many representational sys-
tems. It can be more substantial in that all voters have an equal say in substantive matters, as is 
the case in participatory democracies, or it can be interpreted as a constraint on the legitimacy 
of outcomes according to which a political decision is legitimate or authoritative only if the 
interests of all those concerned were considered, or indeed, anything in between. The diversity 
of democratic regimes and institutions requires a theory of democracy that does justice to the 
variety of democracies and their accompanying systems of participation and representation, but 
also explains what all democratic systems have in common.
If one thinks of voting as a form of expressing one’s political preferences and judgments— that 
a voting procedure is supposed to transform into a more or less coherent collective judgment, as 
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is the case in public choice and social choice theory— then it seems obvious to think of democ-
racy as a kind of preference aggregation procedure where the political preferences of the citizens 
are more or less given and the political result, e.g. the winner of elections, is to be evaluated 
against these. Politics, in this conception of democracy, is the institution that aims to satisfy the 
(political) preferences of citizens, much like markets aim to satisfy the economic preferences of 
consumers. Democracies then are those political aggregation systems where everyone’s prefer-
ence has an equal weight resulting in a fair compromise between these preferences, much as 
equal purchasing power of consumers on the market would lead to fair market outcomes. In this 
light, the concern of social choice theorists for incoherent and manipulable overall collective 
judgments becomes quite relevant. If it can be shown that under real- world conditions specific 
democratic institutions thwart the ‘fair’ outcomes, then so much the worse for those institutions. 
Manipulation of democratic processes, similarly, will be a major worry as these too can thwart 
such ‘fair’ outcomes.
However, democracy’s potential virtues as a fair form of institutional preference aggrega-
tion have not played a dominant role in any alternative school of thinking. In the same 
writings in which the marquis de Condorcet argues that simple majority rule could render 
aggregative results incoherent, he recommends trial by jury using a simple probability cal-
culus. Suppose that a jury has to decide whether or not a defendant is guilty. Suppose that 
for each juror individually the probability that he or she gives the right verdict upon exam-
ining the evidence equals p and p > 0.5. Then the probability that the majority of the jury 
will reach the correct decision approaches 1 as the number of jurors on the jury increases.25 
Extrapolating this rather simple argument to actual juries and actual electorates (as well as 
actual organizations), these authors argue that democratically organized collectives are more 
likely to ‘get it right’. That is, the reason why democracy is preferable to other forms of gov-
ernance is epistemic, rather than that the resulting decision will be a fair compromise of the 
preferences of all citizens.26
Others, however, reject both these ways of thinking about democracy and indeed of politics. 
They emphasize that politics is not just a more or less passive process of preference aggregation 
where political institutions, like markets, simply function to ‘translate’ these preferences into a 
more or less coherent result. Neither is politics an institutional way of consulting the wisdom 
of crowds. Crucial to politics is the formation of those preferences and beliefs. Political debate 
is not just a collective bargaining process, where agents try to maximize their political prefer-
ences or consult others’ beliefs, rather it is the very place where those preferences and beliefs 
are formed. That is, these authors contrast democracy conceived as a market of preferences 
or beliefs with democracy conceived of as a ‘forum’— a place of debate and deliberation.27 For 
these theorists, voting is but one form of democratic participation and not the most interesting 
one for that matter. Furthermore, democratic deliberation that shapes political preferences is 
massively important for the acceptance and legitimacy of the decisions thus reached.28 This 
emphasis on the formative and legitimizing aspects of democratic institutions has spawned a lot 
of research into the efficacy of alternative deliberative institutions. Citizen juries, deliberative 
panels, and many alternative forms of consultation and deliberation have been proposed and 
investigated.29
Here, therefore, we have another example of philosophical reflection on political scientific 
research into the nature of democracy. A lot of this work is done under the heading of ‘political 
theory’ but it is crucial to see and understand that it is born from the cross- fertilization of philo-
sophical and empirical work in political science.
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Freedom
Historically, the interest in democracies comes from a view on political freedom. Democracies, 
it is thought, are free societies. This imprecise claim raises conceptual, methodological, as well 
as empirical questions.
Consider the conceptual issue of freedom. What is it? In 1819 Benjamin Constant wrote his 
famous essay comparing the freedom of the ‘ancients’ with that of the ‘moderns’.30 ‘Ancient’ 
freedom is republican, participatory freedom. On this view, a state is free if it is free from outside 
influences and interference and enjoys self- rule. Citizens have a burdensome moral obligation to 
participate in the governing of the state. This notion of freedom, then, is primarily concerned 
with the question ‘who rules’. ‘Modern’ freedom on the other hand is the freedom one enjoys in 
the absence of the state. A state is free if its citizens have civil liberties and the state is absent 
in some private areas of life. Isaiah Berlin, in his famous inaugural lecture, echoed this distinc-
tion and traced the historical roots of either notion.31 He distinguished ‘negative’ from ‘posi-
tive’ freedom. A person is free in the negative sense, if she is free from external limits on her 
options. (This is similar to Constant’s ‘modern’ sense of freedom.) This view of freedom can be 
traced back to Hobbes.32 Negative freedom then is only impaired by the presence of something. 
A person is free in the ‘positive’ sense, if she is master of her own life; when it is ‘up to her’ what 
she will do. Notice that one can be free in this positive sense, even if there are very few options 
available to the agent. Berlin, like Constant before him, criticized the ancient tradition and 
endorsed the liberal, ‘negative’ version of freedom.
Contemporary authors, however, have a very different understanding of positive freedom. 
Rather than the freedom to self- rule, they think of positive freedom as the presence of the means 
to utilize one’s negative freedom. For example, if there is no access to the Internet in a society 
because of legal prohibitions, that society lacks important negative freedoms. Suppose that these 
prohibitions are lifted and access to the Internet becomes available in this society, but that it is 
prohibitively expensive to use. In that case, there is more negative freedom than before in this 
society, but the positive freedom to utilize this option is lacking. In other words, supporters of 
negative freedom claim that one can only be robbed of one’s freedom by the presence of some 
obstacle; supporters of positive freedom on the other hand hold that one can also be robbed of 
one’s freedom by the absence of something (e.g. sufficient income).
Gerald MacCallum has pointed out that if this is how one understands positive and negative 
freedom, then it is relatively straightforward to combine the two notions in one triadic for-
mula: x is free from y to z, where x ranges over individuals, y over obstacles, and z over actions.33 
The disagreement between supporters of negative freedom and those of positive freedom then is 
not a disagreement as to what the ‘real’ or ‘true’ conception of freedom is. Rather, it is a disagree-
ment about the extension of y and z. This unified conception of freedom is important for the 
theory of the measurement of freedom.
Before we get to the methodological issues at stake in that debate, we need to consider one 
important contemporary third way of understanding freedom. This is the neo- republican theory 
of freedom, which in many ways goes back to the old republican tradition that was rejected by 
Constant. Neo- republicans hold that to be free means that one is free from arbitrary and non- 
controllable power.34 This third way shares with the ‘ancient’ understanding of freedom that 
external influences are seen as something undesirable. It shares with the unified triadic formula-
tion of freedom that one can be unfree when one is subjected to external obstacles or internal 
compulsions (for then one is not free to do z), but only when these are the result of arbitrary 
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and uncontrollable factors. What is more, these factors need not even be active to result in a 
loss of freedom. For example, imagine a benevolent dictator who rules with absolute authority 
over his subjects. He does so with their wishes and wellbeing in mind. He imposes minimal con-
straints on their daily activities and indeed on their political activities. His subjects are free from 
coercion and interference by him and they are free to do (most of) the things they want to do. 
However, should this dictator decide to take away these freedoms and impose fierce constraints 
simply because he feels like it, his subjects are completely at his mercy. It is not unlikely that the 
subjects of our dictator will adapt their behavior so as not to displease him and avoid attracting 
his ire and ill feeling. Neo- republicans argue that this constitutes a loss of freedom. Note that the 
loss is not the result of (actual) coercion and state interference. Nor is it the result of somebody 
other than the subjects determining here and now what they are going to do (i.e. they are free 
in the positive sense as Berlin distinguished it), yet these people lack robust control of their own 
lives. For this reason neo- republicans favor strong constitutions that bind authorities as well as 
certain forms of social support that enable people to be independent and have control over their 
own lives.35
Having distinguished these three ways of thinking about freedom, one might wonder how 
one determines whether one is free. Similarly, one could compare regimes in terms of how much 
freedom they allow their citizens. That is, with the conceptual work out of the way for now, one 
could start to wonder about the measurement of freedom. It is here that the techniques of social 
choice theory once again become relevant.
Some have argued that the idea of measuring freedom is nonsensical. One reason for this can 
be found in what the value of freedom is in the first place. For example, Ronald Dworkin has 
argued that freedom as such does not have any value— only specific freedoms are valuable.36 The 
freedom to buy fifty kinds of soda is irrelevant, whereas freedom of speech is relevant. Therefore, 
the idea that one can attach a value to ‘freedom as such’ is nonsensical, as are comparisons of 
freedom. However, it is an open debate whether freedom only has such specific value. Ian Carter 
has argued that freedom has non- specific value.37 That is, one’s freedom has increased with the 
addition of feasible options. If before one could only get one kind of soda and now fifty kinds of 
soda, that is an enlargement of one’s soda- buying liberty from no liberty to a lot of liberty even 
though there is nothing specifically valuable in the freedom to buy a particular brand of, say, 
root beer.
Using very weak and plausible assumptions, Pattanaik and Xu have constructed a metric of 
freedom that reflects this non- specific value of freedom. It entails that as one’s feasible options 
increase, one is more free— a result they deem to be ‘naïve and trivial’ in that it throws out all 
kinds of other information one may have about the options.38 Taking their lead, others have 
tried to construct measurements of freedom that avoid naïveté and triviality. However, in doing 
so, several difficult problems arise, most notably the problem of how to individuate the feasible 
options open to the agent. If freedom consists, inter alia, in the lack of constraints an agent faces, 
removal of constraints enlarges one’s freedom. So suppose that one makes driving an automobile 
much cheaper. Then one has removed a constraint on driving. How many constraints has one 
removed? Just one, or has one removed a constraint on driving to this or that specific destina-
tion? What should we count? Moreover, how should the individual options be weighed? Does 
the freedom to kill other human beings count for as much as the freedom to borrow books from 
the library? Another problem concerns the comparability of the different ways of constraining 
freedom. Does the unfreedom created by coercion and state interference count for as much as 
the unfreedom created by natural events?
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Traditionally, these questions were objects of abstract theorizing by political theorists and 
political philosophers. More and more, however, they are raised by actual empirical work, for 
example, in the methodology of the various rankings that organizations like Freedom House and 
others publish.39 These questions are not just of concern to political philosophers and theorists 
but have important ramifications for comparative empirical work. It should be clear that this 
work is relevant for how we think of freedom, of its value, of its place in democracies, or indeed, 
of the freedom to vote. In other words, here too we find an example of philosophical reflection 
on research done by political scientists that merits the label ‘philosophy of political science’.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have tried to illustrate that, contrary to the question in our title, there already 
is a philosophy of political science. Much of it is done by political scientists as well as political 
theorists, but not exclusively so. This means that the situation of political science, in spite of the 
details of its emergence on the academic scene or the somewhat chaotic cornucopia of method-
ology and topics, is not much different from the situation of the other special disciplines. So does 
it matter much what we call it or insist that it be recognized as a branch of the philosophy of 
social science? If political theory and the philosophy of political science are largely extensionally 
equivalent, how much advantage is there in trying to create the philosophy of political science? 
Or at least to bring it in out of the shadows and call it what it is?
If the only role that philosophers had in this debate were to say “we should pay more atten-
tion to what they’re doing in political science” the effect would be minimal. For— as we have 
shown— there are those who are already paying attention. Likewise if the conclusion of most 
philosophers turned out to be “there are no current issues in political science that are wor-
thy of much philosophical attention; let the political theorists have it,” we would be loath to 
impose interest where there was none. But neither seems to be the case. Rather the content of 
a legitimately recognized philosophical study of the science of human political behavior seems 
to already be there, as it has been for some time, and has merely not bothered to do the work to 
claim a new title.
Why should it? We think that the payoff could be great. By embracing the idea that the phi-
losophy of political science is part of the philosophy of social science, it will open new doors, as 
those who are schooled in the particular interests and expertise of philosophers or science will 
bring fresh insight to the methodological and explanatory questions that concern political sci-
ence. The establishment of political science a century and a half ago sought its break from the 
study of politics and its pre- scientific history, and took up questions that could only be answered 
by an empirical approach. Doesn’t philosophical concern with this discipline therefore deserve 
its own break from political theory?
Is this to presume that all of political science is (or should be) quantitative? That the war 
with qualitative methods has been won? Some would argue that the reason the philosophy of 
economics and the philosophy of psychology have been able to come forward so robustly is that 
their underlying fields are more scientific, so their ‘philosophy of’ designation is less problematic. 
Sociology, anthropology, and history, however, are less empirical, so their standing as branches 
of the philosophy of social science is more suspect. But note that even the latter have their own 
‘philosophy of’ designations. Of course, this does not presume an answer to the debate over the 
usefulness or status of positivism, interpretivism, or any of the other methodological approaches 
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in political science, any more than in anthropology or sociology. There are quantitative and 
qualitative methods in all of the social sciences. But the focus of all of them is nonetheless 
explanatory and so, finally, empirical. As such, especially given the speed of its recent turn 
toward quantitative methods, as well as the fierce organized resistance to it, political science 
seems long overdue for its own ‘philosophy of’ designation.
The philosophical study of economics and psychology has thrived under this arrangement. So 
has the philosophy of chemistry. We believe that the philosophical questions raised by politi-
cal science will receive more and better- focused attention— and more scholarship devoted to 
the specific questions raised by its methodology— as a result of this self- conscious shift in focus. 
Philosophers of science are well attuned to the explanatory and methodological issues in scien-
tific fields. We bring something that historians of political thought— or what has been called 
“political philosophy”— have not self- consciously wrought, which is the acceptance and consid-
eration of political science as an empirical examination, inter alia, of our ideas about democracy 
and freedom as revealed in our voting behavior.
There are, of course, institutional benefits too: Conferences, symposia, anthologies, and with 
them more scholarship. Just as in the philosophy of chemistry, one expects that the good work 
done so far will be followed by an avalanche of good work to come. Thus do we feel that the phi-
losophy of political science should take its rightful place alongside the philosophy of economics, 
the philosophy of history, and the philosophies of psychology, sociology, and anthropology as a 
branch of the philosophy of social science, devoted to the explanatory questions that arise in the 
empirical study of human political behavior.
So what’s in a name? In itself nothing. Unless you use it to signal others who might have 
missed it that you’re here and worthy of renewed attention. Then it can be extraordinary.
Notes
 1 For more on the history of this transformation see Scerri and McIntyre 1997. For an excellent compen-
dium of work in the philosophy of chemistry before it was called that, see Scerri 1997.
 2 Schliesser 2014.
 3 Thus, for example, the motto of the seminar room of the Political Science Department at Johns Hopkins 
University, one of the early powerhouses of the newly established political science, was “History is past 
politics and politics present history.”
 4 On this most authoritative histories of the discipline concur. For a good overview, see Farr 1988.
 5 The question as to what constitutes ‘politics’ is itself a question of ongoing concern and disagreement, 
as can be seen if one compares, for example, Lasswell 1936; Arendt 1958; Easton 1965; Crick 2000; 
Leftwich 2004.
 6 This is one way in which the so- called ‘economic imperialism’ is manifested (Mäki 2009).
 7 Monroe 2015.
 8 It is important to point out here, however, that all of our examples focus more or less on the increas-
ing use of formal methods (especially social choice theory) in political science, as well as some of the 
reactions to this trend. We do not mean to take sides in the debate about the merits of these methods. 
They are certainly not the “only game in town.” However, they are illustrative of our claim that there 
is a case for the existence of a philosophy of political science.
 9 But see Riker and Ordeshook 1968 for a contrary result.
 10 What is more, if this line of reasoning is correct, it is also paradoxical that voters take the effort to 
inform themselves about political issues and what each candidate stands for. In this connection the rise 
of voting advice applications is remarkable, e.g. Fossen and Anderson 2014.
 11 A nice overview of the theory and its main results is Mueller 1997.
 12 Brennan and Lomasky 1993.
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 13 Some authors have concluded that voters are irrational and that, therefore, politics is intrinsically 
irrational, e.g. Caplan 2007, 2008. Again, the potential for experimental work on this assumption, by 
analogy with behavioral economics, seems ripe.
 14 See for example Elster 1983, 1989. Of course, there are concerns about the adoption of such ideal types 




 18 See Riker 1982b for an overview.
 19 Riker 1982a.
 20 For example, Mackie 2003.
 21 Black 1948. A ranking profile is ‘single peaked’ if one can order the alternatives x, y, z, from ‘left to 
right’, such that each individual’s ranking will have a most preferred alternative on that line with 
decreasing preference as alternatives get more distant (in either direction) from the most preferred 
position. In the example of Condorcet, the preferences of the electorate are not single peaked.
 22 For example, Sen 1970.
 23 One can’t here resist sharing an old joke about the irrationality of considering irrelevant alternatives. 
A philosopher walks into a diner to order a piece of pie. The waiter says “We have cherry and apple.” 
The philosopher orders a slice of apple pie. The waiter then says “Oh wait, we also have pumpkin,” to 
which the philosopher replies “In that case I’ll take the cherry.”
 24 Gibbard 1973; Satterthwaite 1975. It is, of course, unclear to what extent that is a bad thing: Dowding 
and Hees 2008.
 25 Here is an arithmetical example. Suppose a typical juror has a probability of p = 0 6.  to arrive at the 
right answer. A jury consisting of one juror then will return the correct verdict with P = 0 6. . Suppose 
we expand the jury to three members, then the probability that the majority of the jury will reach a 
correct verdict then equals P = + ⋅ ⋅( ) =0 6 3 0 6 0 6 0 4 0 6483. . . . . . It is crucial, however, that for this to 
work the jurors must not be influenced by one another before they have made their decision. For more 
on the intricacies of the Condorcet Jury Theorem see Sunstein 2008.
 26 For example, Estlund 2008.
 27 Elster 1997.
 28 Rawls 1971; Habermas 1976; Rawls 1993; Habermas 1998.
 29 The work of John Dryzek is a good example of this trend to test philosophically inspired claims about 
deliberative institutions empirically: J. Dryzek 1999, 1999; J. S. Dryzek 2006, 2010.
 30 Repr. in Constant 1988.
 31 Berlin 1969.
 32 Hobbes 1991, ch. 21.
 33 MacCallum 1967.
 34 Pettit 1997, 2012.
 35 See also Pettit 2014.
 36 Dworkin 1978, 268– 74.
 37 Carter 1999.
 38 Pattanaik and Xu 1990.
 39 For example, the kinds of comparisons that are made in “Freedom House” 2015; “Country 
Rankings:  World and Global Economy Rankings on Economic Freedom” 2015; “How Free Is Your 
State?” 2015.
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